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Abstract—In this paper, we consider the achievable sum
secrecy rate in full-duplex wiretap channel in the presence
of an eavesdropper and imperfect channel state information
(CSI). We assume that the users participating in full-duplex
communication and the eavesdropper have single antenna each.
The users have individual transmit power constraints. They also
transmit jamming signals to improve the secrecy rates. We obtain
the achievable perfect secrecy rate region by maximizing the sum
secrecy rate. We also obtain the corresponding optimum powers
of the message signals and the jamming signals. Numerical results
that show the impact of imperfect CSI on the achievable secrecy
rate region are presented.
keywords: Full-duplex, physical layer security, secrecy rate, linear and
semidefinite programming.
I. INTRODUCTION
Transmitting messages with perfect secrecy using physical
layer techniques was first studied in [1] on a physically
degraded discrete memoryless wiretap channel model. Later,
this work was extended to more general broadcast channel
in [2] and Gaussian channel in [3], respectively. Wireless
transmissions, being broadcast in nature, can be easily eaves-
dropped and hence require special attention to design modern
secure wireless networks. Secrecy rate and capacity of point-
to-point multi-antenna wiretap channels have been reported
in the literature by several authors, e.g., [4]–[9]. In the above
works, the transceiver operates in half-duplex mode, i.e., either
it transmits or receives at any given time instant. On the other
hand, full-duplex operation gives the advantage of simultane-
ous transmission and reception of messages [10]. But loopback
self-interference and imperfect channel state information (CSI)
are limitations. Full-duplex communication without secrecy
constraint has been investigated by many authors, e.g., [11]–
[14]. Full-duplex communication with secrecy constraint has
been investigated in [15]–[17], where the achievable secrecy
rate region of two way Gaussian and discrete memoryless
wiretap channels have been characterized. In the above works,
CSI in all the links are assumed to be perfect.
In this paper, we consider the achievable sum secrecy rate in
full-duplex wiretap channel in the presence of an eavesdropper
and imperfect CSI. The both users participating in full-duplex
communication and the eavesdropper are assumed to have
single antenna each. The CSI errors in all the links are assumed
to be bounded in their respective absolute values. In addition
to a message signal, each user transmits a jamming signal in
order to improve the secrecy rates. The users operate under
individual power constraints. For this scenario, we obtain
the achievable perfect secrecy rate region by maximizing the
sum secrecy rate. We also obtain the corresponding optimum
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Fig. 1. System model for full-duplex communication.
powers of the message signals and jamming signals. Numerical
results that illustrate the impact of imperfect CSI on the
achievable secrecy rate region are presented.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The system
model is given In Sec. II. Secrecy rate for perfect CSI is
presented in III. Secrecy rate with imperfect CSI is studied
in IV. Results and discussions are presented in Section V.
Conclusions are presented in Section VI.
Notations : A  0 implies that A is a positive semidef-
inite matrix. Transpose and complex conjugate transpose op-
erations are denoted by [.]T and [.]∗, respectively. |.| denotes
absolute value operation.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider full-duplex communication between two users
S1 and S2 in the presence of an eavesdropper E. S1, S2 and
E are assumed to have single antenna each. The complex
channel gains on various links are as shown in Fig. 1.
S1 and S2 simultaneously transmit messages W1 and W2,
respectively, in n channel uses. W1 and W2 are independent
and equiprobable over {1, 2, · · · , 2nR1} and {1, 2, · · · , 2nR2},
respectively. R1 and R2 are the information rates (bits per
channel use) associated with W1 and W2, respectively, which
need to be transmitted with perfect secrecy with respect to
E [17]. S1 and S2 map W1 and W2 to i.i.d. codewords
{X1i }
n
i=1
(
∼ CN (0, P1s)
)
and {X2i }ni=1
(
∼ CN (0, P2s)
)
,
respectively, of length n. In order to degrade the eavesdropper
channels and improve the secrecy rates, both S1 and S2
transmit i.i.d. jamming signals {N1i }ni=1
(
∼ CN (0, P1n)
)
and
{N2i }
n
i=1
(
∼ CN (0, P2n)
)
, respectively, of length n. S1 and
S2 transmit the symbols X1i +N1i and X2i +N2i , respectively,
during the ith channel use, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Hereafter, we will
denote the symbols in {X1i }ni=1, {X2i }ni=1 {N1i }ni=1, {N2i }ni=1
with X1, X2, N1 and N2, respectively. We also assume that
all the channel gains remain static over the codeword transmit
duration. Let P1 and P2 be the transmit power budget for S1
and S2, respectively. This implies that
[P1s + P1n, P2s + P2n]
T ≤ [P1, P2]
T . (1)
Let y1, y2 and yE denote the received signals at S1, S2 and
E, respectively. We have
y1 = h11(X
1 +N1) + h12(X
2 +N2) + η1, (2)
y2 = h21(X
1 +N1) + h22(X
2 +N2) + η2, (3)
yE = z1(X
1 +N1) + z2(X
2 +N2) + ηE , (4)
where η1, η2 and ηE are i.i.d. (∼ CN (0, N0)) receiver noise
terms.
III. SUM SECRECY RATE - PERFECT CSI
In this section, we assume perfect CSI in all the links. Since
S1 knows the transmitted symbol (X1+N1), in order to detect
X2, S1 subtracts h11(X1 +N1) from the received signal y1,
i.e.,
y
′
1
= y1 − h11(X
1 +N1) = h12(X
2 +N2) + η1. (5)
Similarly, since S2 knows the transmitted symbol (X2+N2),
to detect X1, S2 subtracts h22(X2 + N2) from the received
signal y2, i.e.,
y
′
2
= y2 − h22(X
2 +N2) = h21(X
1 +N1) + η2. (6)
Using (5) and (6), we get the following information rates for
X1 and X2, respectively:
R
′
1
△
= I
(
X1; y
′
2
)
= log2
(
1 +
|h21|
2
P1s
N0 + |h21|
2P1n
)
, (7)
R
′
2
△
= I
(
X2; y
′
1
)
= log
2
(
1 +
|h12|
2
P2s
N0 + |h12|
2P2n
)
. (8)
Using (4), we get the following information leakage rate at E:
R
′
E
△
= I
(
X1, X2; yE
)
= log2
(
1 +
|z1|
2
P1s + |z2|
2
P2s
N0 + |z1|
2
P1n + |z2|
2
P2n
)
. (9)
We denote the information capacities by C
1
, C
2
, and CE ,
respectively, as follows:
C1 = log2
(
1 +
|h21|
2P1
N0
)
, (10)
C2 = log2
(
1 +
|h12|
2
P2
N0
)
, (11)
CE = log2
(
1 +
|z1|
2
P1 + |z2|
2
P2
N0
)
. (12)
A secrecy rate pair (R1, R2) which falls in the following
region is achievable [17]:
0 ≤ R1 ≤ R
′
1
, 0 ≤ R2 ≤ R
′
2
,
0 ≤ R1 +R2 ≤ R
′
1 +R
′
2 −R
′
E ,
[P1s + P1n, P2s + P2n]
T ≤ [P1, P2]
T
,
[P1s, P1n, P2s, P2n]
T ≥ [0, 0, 0, 0]T . (13)
We intend to maximize the sum secrecy rate subject to the
power constraint, i.e.,
max
P1s, P1n,
P2s, P2n
R
′
1
+R
′
2
−R
′
E (14)
= max
P1s, P1n,
P2s, P2n
{
log2
(
1 +
|h21|
2
P1s
N0 + |h21|
2
P1n
)
+ log
2
(
1 +
|h12|
2
P2s
N0 + |h12|
2P2n
)
− log
2
(
1 +
|z1|
2
P1s + |z2|
2
P2s
N0 + |z1|
2P1n + |z2|
2P2n
)}
(15)
s.t. [P1s + P1n, P2s + P2n]
T ≤ [P1, P2]
T ,
[P1s, P1n, P2s, P2n]
T ≥ [0, 0, 0, 0]T . (16)
This is a nonlinear optimization problem, and we solve it using
two-dimensional search as follows.
Step1 : Divide the intervals [0, C1] and [0, C2] in K and L
small intervals, respectively, of size △1 = C1K and △2 =
C2
L
where K and L are large integers. Let R′k1 = k△1 and R
′l
2 =
l△2, where k = 0, 1, 2, · · · ,K and l = 0, 1, 2, · · · , L.
Step2 : For a given (R′k
1
, R
′l
2
) pair, we minimize R′E as
follows:
R
′′kl
E
△
= min
P1s, P1n,
P2s, P2n
log2
(
1 +
|z1|
2
P1s + |z2|
2
P2s
N0 + |z1|
2
P1n + |z2|
2
P2n
)
(17)
s.t.
R
′′k
1
△
= log
2
(
1 +
|h21|
2
P1s
N0 + |h21|
2P1n
)
≥ R
′k
1
,
R
′′l
2
△
= log
2
(
1 +
|h12|
2P2s
N0 + |h12|
2P2n
)
≥ R
′l
2
,
[P1s + P1n, P2s + P2n]
T ≤ [P1, P2]
T
,
[P1s, P1n, P2s, P2n]
T ≥ [0, 0, 0, 0]T . (18)
The maximum sum secrecy rate is given by
maxk=0,1,2,··· ,K,
l=0,1,2,··· ,L
(R
′′k
1
+R
′′l
2
−R
′′kl
E ).
We solve the optimization problem (17) as follows. Drop-
ping the logarithm in the objective function in (17), we rewrite
the optimization problem (17) in the following equivalent
form:
min
t, P1s, P1n,
P2s, P2n
t (19)
s.t.
(
|z1|
2
P1s + |z2|
2
P2s
)
− t
(
N0 + |z1|
2
P1n + |z2|
2
P2n
)
≤ 0,
(
2R
′k
1 − 1
)(
N0 + |h21|
2
P1n
)
−
(
|h21|
2
P1s
)
≤ 0,
(
2R
′l
2 − 1
)(
N0 + |h12|
2
P2n
)
−
(
|h12|
2
P2s
)
≤ 0,
[P1s + P1n, P2s + P2n]
T ≤ [P1, P2]
T
,
[P1s, P1n, P2s, P2n]
T ≥ [0, 0, 0, 0]T . (20)
For a given t, the above problem is formulated as the following
linear feasibility problem [18]:
find P1s, P1n, P2s, P2n, (21)
subject to the constraints in (20). The minimum value of t,
denoted by tklmin, can be obtained using bisection method as
follows. Let tklmin lie in the interval [tll, tul]. The value of tll
can be taken as 0 (corresponding to the minimum information
rate of 0) and tul can be taken as (2CE−1), which corresponds
to the information capacity of the eavesdropper link. Check
the feasibility of (21) at tklmin = (tll + tul)/2. If feasible, then
tul = t
kl
min, else tll = tklmin. Repeat this until tul − tll ≤ ζ,
where ζ is a small positive number. Using tklmin in (17), R
′′kl
E
is given by
R
′′kl
E = log2(1 + t
kl
min). (22)
IV. SUM SECRECY RATE - IMPERFECT CSI
In this section, we assume that the available CSI in all the
links are imperfect, i.e.,
h11 = h
0
11 + e11, h12 = h
0
12 + e12, (23)
h21 = h
0
21
+ e21, h22 = h
0
22
+ e22, (24)
z1 = z
0
1 + e1, z2 = z
0
2 + e2, (25)
where h0
11
, h0
12
, h0
21
, h0
22
, z0
1
, and z0
2
are the estimates of h
11
,
h12, h21, h22, z1, and z2, respectively, and e011, e012, e021, e022,
e0
1
, and e0
2
are the corresponding errors. We assume that errors
are bounded in their respective absolute values as
|e11|
2 ≤ ǫ211, |e12|
2 ≤ ǫ212, (26)
|e21|
2 ≤ ǫ2
21
, |e22|
2 ≤ ǫ2
22
, (27)
|e1|
2 ≤ ǫ2
1
, |e2|
2 ≤ ǫ2
2
. (28)
With the above error model, we rewrite (5), (6), and (4) as
follows:
y
′
1 = y1 − h
0
11(X
1 +N1)
= e0
11
(X1 +N1) + (h0
12
+ e12)(X
2 +N2) + η1, (29)
y
′
2
= y2 − h
0
22
(X2 +N2)
= (h021 + e21)(X
1 +N1) + e022(X
2 +N2) + η2, (30)
yE = (z
0
1
+ e1)(X
1 +N1) + (z0
2
+ e2)(X
2 +N2)
+ηE . (31)
In order to compute R′k
1
, R
′l
2
, and R′′klE , respectively, as
described in Step1 and Step2 in Section III, we get the
capacities C1, C2, and CE with imperfect CSI as follows:
C1 = min
e21
log
2
(
1 +
|h0
21
+ e21|
2
P1
N0
)
, s.t. |e21|
2 ≤ ǫ2
21
, (32)
= log
2
(
1 +
||h0
21
| − ǫ21|
2
P1
N0
)
. (33)
C2 = min
e12
log
2
(
1 +
|h0
12
+ e12|
2
P2
N0
)
, s.t. |e12|
2 ≤ ǫ2
12
, (34)
= log2
(
1 +
||h0
12
| − ǫ12|
2
P2
N0
)
. (35)
CE = max
e1, e2
log2
(
1 +
|z0
1
+ e1|
2
P1 + |z02 + e2|
2
P2
N0
)
,
s.t. |e1|
2 ≤ ǫ21, |e2|
2 ≤ ǫ22, (36)
= log2
(
1 +
||z01 |+ ǫ1|
2
P1 + ||z02 |+ ǫ2|
2
P2
N0
)
. (37)
Using (29), (30), and (31), we rewrite the optimization prob-
lem (17) as follows:
R
′′kl
E
△
= min
P1s, P1n,
P2s, P2n
max
e11, e12, e21,
e22, e1, e2
log2
(
1 +
|(z01 + e1)|
2
P1s + |(z02 + e2)|
2
P2s
N0 + |(z01 + e1)|
2
P1n + |(z02 + e2)|
2
P2n
)
(38)
s.t.
R
′′k
1
△
= min
e21, e22
log
2
(
1 +
|h021 + e21|
2
P1s
N0 + |e22|
2(P2s + P2n) + |h021 + e21|
2
P1n
)
≥ R
′k
1 , (39)
R
′′l
2
△
= min
e11, e12
log
2
(
1 +
|h012 + e12|
2
P2s
N0 + |e11|
2(P1s + P1n) + |h012 + e12|
2
P2n
)
≥ R
′l
2 , (40)
|e11|
2 ≤ ǫ211, |e12|
2 ≤ ǫ212, |e21|
2 ≤ ǫ221,
|e22|
2 ≤ ǫ222, |e1|
2 ≤ ǫ21, |e2|
2 ≤ ǫ22. (41)
[P1s + P1n, P2s + P2n]
T ≤ [P1, P2]
T
,
[P1s, P1n, P2s, P2n]
T ≥ [0, 0, 0, 0]T . (42)
In the constraints (39) and (40), additional noise appear
due the terms e0
22
(X2 + N2) and e0
11
(X1 + N1), respec-
tively, which have been treated as self noise. For a given
(R
′k
1
, R
′l
2
) pair, the worst case sum secrecy rate is given by
maxk=0,1,2,··· ,K,
l=0,1,2,··· ,L
(R
′′k
1
+R
′′l
2
−R
′′kl
E ).
We solve the optimization problem (38) as follows. We write
the optimization problem (38) in the following form:
min
P1s, P1n,
P2s, P2n
max
e11, e12, e21,
e22, e1, e2( |(z0
1
+ e1)|
2
P1s + |(z02 + e2)|
2
P2s
N0 + |(z01 + e1)|
2
P1n + |(z02 + e2)|
2
P2n
)
(43)
s.t.
min
e21, e22
( |h0
21
+ e21|
2
P1s
N0 + |e22|
2(P2s + P2n) + |h021 + e21|
2
P1n
)
≥ (2R
′k
1 − 1),
min
e11, e12
( |h012 + e12|2P2s
N0 + |e11|
2
(P1s + P1n) + |h012 + e12|
2
P2n
)
≥ (2R
′l
2 − 1),
|e11|
2 ≤ ǫ211, |e12|
2 ≤ ǫ212, |e21|
2 ≤ ǫ221,
|e22|
2 ≤ ǫ222, |e1|
2 ≤ ǫ21, |e2|
2 ≤ ǫ22.
[P1s + P1n, P2s + P2n]
T ≤ [P1, P2]
T
,
[P1s, P1n, P2s, P2n]
T ≥ [0, 0, 0, 0]T . (44)
We get the following upper bound for the above optimization
problem:
min
P1s, P1n,
P2s, P2n
min
e12, e21, e1, e2,
t1, t2, t3, t4,
t5, t6, t7, t8
( t1 + t2
N0 + t3 + t4
)
(45)
s.t. t3 ≥ 0, t4 ≥ 0, t5 ≥ 0, t7 ≥ 0, (46)
∀e1 s.t. |e1|
2 ≤ ǫ21 =⇒
|(z01 + e1)|
2
P1s − t1 ≤ 0, (47)
∀e1 s.t. |e1|
2 ≤ ǫ21 =⇒
−|(z0
1
+ e1)|
2
P1n + t3 ≤ 0, (48)
∀e2 s.t. |e2|
2 ≤ ǫ22 =⇒
|(z0
2
+ e2)|
2
P2s − t2 ≤ 0, (49)
∀e2 s.t. |e2|
2 ≤ ǫ2
2
=⇒
−|(z0
2
+ e2)|
2
P2n + t4 ≤ 0, (50)( t5
N0 + |ǫ22|
2(P2s + P2n) + t6
)
≥ (2R
′k
1 − 1), (51)
∀e21 s.t. |e21|
2 ≤ ǫ2
21
=⇒
−|(h021 + e21)|
2
P1s + t5 ≤ 0, (52)
∀e21 s.t. |e21|
2 ≤ ǫ2
21
=⇒
|(h021 + e21)|
2
P1n − t6 ≤ 0, (53)( t7
N0 + |ǫ11|
2
(P1s + P1n) + t8
)
≥ (2R
′l
2 − 1), (54)
∀e12 s.t. |e12|
2 ≤ ǫ212 =⇒
−|(h012 + e12)|
2
P2s + t7 ≤ 0, (55)
∀e12 s.t. |e12|
2 ≤ ǫ212 =⇒
|(h0
12
+ e12)|
2
P2n − t8 ≤ 0, (56)
[P1s + P1n, P2s + P2n]
T ≤ [P1, P2]
T
, (57)
[P1s, P1n, P2s, P2n]
T ≥ [0, 0, 0, 0]T . (58)
We use the S-procedure to transform the pairs of quadratic
inequalities in (47), (48), (49), (50), (52), (53), (55), and (56)
to equivalent linear matrix inequalities (LMI) [18]. We get the
following single minimization form for the above optimization
problem:
min
P1s, P1n, P2s, P2n,
t1, t2,··· ,t8,
λ1, λ2,··· ,λ8,
t
t (59)
s.t. t3 ≥ 0, t4 ≥ 0, t5 ≥ 0, t7 ≥ 0,(
t1 + t2
)
− t
(
N0 + t3 + t4
)
≤ 0,
(2R
′k
1 − 1)
(
N0 + |ǫ22|
2
(P2s + P2n) + t6
)
− t5 ≤ 0,
(2R
′l
2 − 1)
(
N0 + |ǫ11|
2
(P1s + P1n) + t8
)
− t7 ≤ 0,[
−P1s + λ1 −z01P1s
−z0∗
1
P1s −|z01 |
2
P1s + t1 − λ1ǫ21
]
 0, λ1 ≥ 0,[
P1n + λ2 z01P1n
z0∗
1
P1n |z01 |
2
P1n − t3 − λ2ǫ21
]
 0, λ2 ≥ 0,[
−P2s + λ3 −z02P2s
−z0∗
2
P2s −|z02 |
2
P2s + t2 − λ3ǫ22
]
 0, λ3 ≥ 0,[
P2n + λ4 z02P2n
z0∗
2
P2n |z02 |
2
P2n − t4 − λ4ǫ22
]
 0, λ4 ≥ 0,[
P1s + λ5 h021P1s
h0∗
21
P1s |h021|
2
P1s − t5 − λ5ǫ221
]
 0, λ5 ≥ 0,[
−P1n + λ6 −h021P1n
−h0∗
21
P1n −|h021|
2
P1n + t6 − λ6ǫ221
]
 0, λ6 ≥ 0,[
P2s + λ7 h012P2s
h0∗
12
P2s |h012|
2
P2s − t7 − λ7ǫ212
]
 0, λ7 ≥ 0,[
−P2n + λ8 −h012P2n
−h0∗
12
P2n −|h012|
2
P2n + t8 − λ8ǫ212
]
 0, λ8 ≥ 0,
[P1s + P1n, P2s + P2n]
T ≤ [P1, P2]
T
,
[P1s, P1n, P2s, P2n]
T ≥ [0, 0, 0, 0]T . (60)
For a given t, the above problem is formulated as the following
semidefinite feasibility problem [18]:
find P1s, P1n, P2s, P2n, t1, t2, · · · , t8,
λ1, λ2, · · · , λ8, (61)
subject to the constraints in (60). The minimum value of t,
denoted by tklmin, can be obtained using bisection method as
described in section III. The value of tll can be taken as 0
(corresponding to the minimum information rate of 0). The
value of tul can be taken as (2CE − 1), which corresponds to
the best case information capacity of the eavesdropper link.
Using tklmin in (38), R
′′kl
E is given by
R
′′kl
E = log2(1 + t
kl
min). (62)
V. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
In this section, we present numerical results on the secrecy
rate under perfect and imperfect CSI conditions. We have used
the following channel gains as the estimates: h0
12
= 0.5054−
0.1449i, h021 = −0.0878 + 1.0534i, z
0
1 = 0.1187 − 0.2135i,
z0
2
= 0.1268 + 0.2882i. We assume that the magnitudes of
the CSI errors in all the links are equal, i.e., ǫ11 = ǫ12 =
ǫ21 = ǫ22 = ǫ1 = ǫ2 = ǫ. We also assume that N0 = 1. In
Fig. 2 and Fig. 3, we plot the (R1, R2) region obtained by
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Fig. 2. Achievable (R1, R2) region in full-duplex communication. P1 =
P2 = 3 dB, ǫ = 0.0, 0.01, 0.02, 0.03, 0.04, and N0 = 1.
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.50
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
R1 Bits/ChannelUse
R
2
 
B
it
s
/C
h
a
n
n
e
lU
s
e
 
 
Perfect CSI (ε = 0.0)
Imperfect CSI (ε = 0.01)
Imperfect CSI (ε = 0.02)
Imperfect CSI (ε = 0.03)
Imperfect CSI (ε = 0.04)
Fig. 3. Achievable (R1, R2) region in full-duplex communication. P1 =
P2 = 6 dB, ǫ = 0.0, 0.01, 0.02, 0.03, 0.04, and N0 = 1.
maximizing the sum secrecy rate for various values of ǫ =
0.0, 0.01, 0.02, 0.03, 0.04. Results in Fig. 2 and Fig. 3
are generated for fixed powers P1 = P2 = 3 dB and P1 =
P2 = 6 dB, respectively. We observe that as the magnitude
of the CSI error increases the corresponding sum secrecy rate
decreases which results in the shrinking of the achievable rate
region. Also, as the power is increased from 3 dB to 6 dB,
the achievable secrecy rate region increases.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We investigated the sum secrecy rate and the corresponding
achievable secrecy rate region in full-duplex wiretap channel
when the CSI in all the links are imperfect. We obtained the
optimum powers of the message and jamming signals which
maximize the sum secrecy rate. Numerical results illustrated
the impact of imperfect CSI on the achievable secrecy rate
region.
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